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The Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons 
within the Framework of the Npt: 
Limits and Possibilities 
Introduction 
States have long been trying to reduce their security risks through instruments of inter-
national law. Agreements and treaties about nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation 
were first signed during the Cold War, when the idea spread that the proliferation of 
weapons of mass destruction represents a great threat to international peace and securi-
ty.1 
There is no global authority controlling nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament 
efforts, rather there are numerous international treaties, organizations and bodies that 
deal with and fight against the spread of nuclear weapons, or aim to reduce the already 
existing stocks. Among these treaties we can find both bilateral treaties, like the SALT 
agreements, and multilateral ones, like the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear 
Weapons, the Partial Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty, or the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban 
Treaty. We can also differentiate between global and regional agreements. The interna-
tional organizations dealing with nuclear issues can also be categorized as either global, 
like the International Atomic Energy Agency, or regional, like the organizations set up 
by nuclear-weapon-ffee zone agreements. 
It is apparent that the international nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament sys-
tem is quite extensive and complex, however, one treaty is considered to be the corner-
stone of nuclear non-proliferation: the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Wea-
pons (hereinafter: the NPT). This paper will examine the NPT and its main provisions, 
usually referred to as the pillars of the treaty. The aim of the paper is to highlight the 
limits of the NPT: the barriers that prevent the treaty from becoming truly global and 
from reaching complete nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament. 
1 GRAHAM, THOMAS JR. : International Law and the Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. The George Wa-
shington International Law Review (33) 2000. p. 50. 
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1. The three pillars of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons 
The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty was signed in 1968 and entered into force on 5 
March 1970. It is considered the most important global treaty in the field of nuclear 
non-proliferation. The treaty is based on three interlocking pillars: nuclear non-
proliferation, nuclear disarmament and the peaceful use of nuclear energy. What are 
States parties obliged to do under the treaty? 
The first two articles of the treaty highlight the idea of non-proliferation. According 
to Article I, the signatories, who already own nuclear weapons, agree not to transfer 
nuclear weapons, nuclear explosive devices or the control over such weapons or devices 
to non-nuclear weapon states and do not help these states in any way (directly of indi-
rectly) in acquiring or having control over such weapons or explosive devices. They 
cannot assist, induce or encourage these states in the aforementioned actions either.2 
Simultaneously, according to Article II, states undertake not to receive nuclear wea-
pons, nuclear explosive devices or control over such weapons or devices, and not to 
create or in any way acquire such weapons. Non-nuclear weapon states cannot receive 
assistance either in reaching the abovementioned goals.3 
The non-proliferation pillar is further assisted by Article III of the NPT, according to 
which non-nuclear weapon States parties undertake to accept safeguards with the Inter-
national Atomic Energy Agency (hereinafter: IAEA) for the purpose of verification of 
the fulfillment of their obligations in relation to the NPT. The reason why these safe-
guards are important is because there are more than 430 reactors around the globe, 
while 67 are under construction.4 Even though not all of these reactors are capable of 
manufacturing a nuclear weapon, many of them are which makes maintaining high se-
curity and safety standards in these nuclear reactors crucial. The responsibility for this 
lies within the hands of the government of the state on the territory of which the reactor 
is standing. Security is also important in these establishments, because some of them are 
situated in conflict ridden areas.5 
The second pillar of the NPT is nuclear disarmament, which is laid down in Article 
VI of the treaty. Pursuant to this article, all parties to the treaty accept to participate in 
negotiations in good faith to reach the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear 
disarmament, under strict and effective international control.6 States parties also under-
take to negotiate a treaty on general and complete disarmament, which can be consi-
dered a promise towards the complete disarmament of nuclear weapons. This treaty, 
however, has not been negotiated yet, therefore the complete disarmament mentioned in 
Article VI is only a dream so far. The NPT does not give a clear deadline when this 
2 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, (hereinafter: NPT) New York, 1968. 729 U.N.T.S. 
161. Article I. 
3 NPT Article II. 
4 Number of nuclear reactors operable and under construction. World Nuclear Association. 
http://www.world-nuclear.org/Nuclear-Basics/Global-number-of-nuclear-reactors/ (18 June 2013) 
5 JOYNER, CHRISTOPHER C., PARKHOUSE, ALEXANDER IAN: Nuclear Terrorism in a Globalizing World: 
Assessing the Threat and the Emerging Management Regime. Stanford Journal of International Law (45) 
2009. p. 217. 
6 NPT Article VI. 
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treaty or when complete disarmament should be reached, it only mentions that the ces-
sation of the nuclear arms race should be reached „at an early date".7 States parties are 
therefore left with no clear guidelines on the deadline of their commitments. According 
to nuclear weapon states, humanity has already set foot on the road towards complete 
nuclear disarmament with bilateral disarmament agreements, which have obliged states 
to reduce their nuclear arsenals. The effectiveness of these steps is questioned by non-
nuclear weapon states, who believe that disarmament initiatives are moving ahead quite 
slowly. If we take into consideration the fact that the NPT came into force in 1970, and 
complete nuclear disarmament still does not seem close or even achievable in the up-
coming years, even though more than 40 years have passed, we can agree with non-
nuclear weapon states. 
Why are these two pillars so important? During the Cold War, an extensive nuclear 
proliferation took place in the world, during which a vast number of nuclear weapons 
was accumulated. Even though the number of nuclear weapon states did not rise to the 
predicted level, the amount of nuclear arms worldwide increased significantly. Since 
this amount has increased, the global quantity of nuclear weapons is still a threat to the 
international community, even if the number of nuclear weapon states remains under 
ten. At the beginning of the 1980s, the amount of nuclear warheads accumulated global-
ly (50-60 thousand warheads) would have been enough to destroy the world multiple 
times. The amount of nuclear explosives in the world could have substituted 3 tons of 
traditional explosives per person on the globe.8 Even though the exact numbers are un-
known, currently, at least an estimated 17,000 nuclear warheads exist worldwide, most 
of which can be found in the Russian Federation and the United States of America.9 The 
pure amount of nuclear weapons existing in the world is enough to serve as a motivation 
to start nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament. 
The third pillar of the NPT is the peaceful use of nuclear energy, which is an in-
alienable right of States parties. According to Article IV of the treaty, the peaceful use 
of nuclear energy covers the research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful 
purposes, however, these activities must be in line with Articles I and II of the NPT.10 
The treaty also permits the exchange of equipment, materials, and information, when it 
comes to the peaceful use of nuclear energy. Consequently, the NPT is based on a con-
sensus between States parties, according to which acquiring or constructing a nuclear 
weapon is prohibited, however, in return, the peaceful use of nuclear energy is allowed. 
There is basically a bargain between nuclear weapon and non-nuclear weapon states: 
states not owning nuclear weapons agree to non-proliferation in exchange for complete 
nuclear disarmament in the long run. 
7 NPT Article VI. 
8 BOGNÁR KÁROLY: Biztonság a nukleáris korban. Budapest, 1985. p. 57. 
9 Status of World Nuclear Forces. Federation of American Scientists, http://www.fas.org/programs/ 
ssp/nukes/nuclearweapons/nukestatus.html (18 June 2013) 
10 NPT Article IV.(l) 
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2. Limits of the Treaty 
Even though the NPT is considered the cornerstone of nuclear non-proliferation, the 
treaty faces several challenges. Among these is the previously mentioned fact that the 
treaty does not give clear guidelines and a deadline for complete nuclear disarmament. 
However, the biggest challenge lies in the attitude of the international community. The 
NPT has to deal with States parties who do not fulfil their obligations, and states who 
are not even parties to the treaty. Furthermore, the discriminative nature of the non-
proliferation and disarmament system and the weak results of the NPT review confe-
rences have to be mentioned. How do these difficulties affect the non-proliferation sys-
tem and the States parties to the NPT? 
2.1. The uncertainties concerning States parties to the NPT 
One of the most notable failures of the NPT is the uncertainty in relation to its States 
parties. Not only states not party to the treaty present a threat towards nuclear non-
proliferation, but those states who are parties to the treaty but do not fulfil their obliga-
tions as well. 
North Korea is an example: even though the country is not a State party to the treaty 
anymore, it used to be, and the treaty or the international community could not stop it 
from proceeding with its nuclear program. The state's nuclear ambitions date back dec-
ades. Suspicions of a North Korean nuclear program first arose in the 1980s, when the 
country built its second nuclear reactor at Yongbyon, a much larger reactor than the first 
one or than an average nuclear plant, and when other elements of a possible nuclear 
program started to show on satellite photos.11 In these alarming circumstances, the in-
ternational community managed to convince North Korea to sign the NPT, which it did 
in 1985 under international pressure. However, it soon became apparent that the state 
was not satisfied with the restraints the NPT imposed on its nuclear developments, 
therefore it threatened to withdraw from the treaty in 1993.12 The crisis was averted 
then, but States parties to the NPT could not stop North Korea from leaving the treaty in 
the 21st century. The state withdrew in 2003, and conducted nuclear weapon tests in 
2006, 2009 and 2013, leaving its situation one of the most difficult challenges the NPT 
members had to face to date. 
At present, the biggest cause for concern is Iran, a state which is suspected of con-
ducting a military nuclear program in the hope of developing a nuclear weapon. The 
Iranian nuclear crisis broke out around the time the North Korean one came to end with 
the latter state's withdrawal from the NPT. In 2002, the spokesman of the Iranian oppo-
sition group revealed that there was a uranium enrichment site in Natanz and a heavy 
water plant in Arak under construction.13 The statement was followed by outrage 
through the international community, since Iran, a State party to the NPT, has signed a 
Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA, but did not declare these facilities. This lack of 
" MAZARR, MICHAEL ¡. North Korea and the Bomb: A Case Study in Nonproliferation. New York, 1995. p. 36. 
12 MAZARR, 1995. P. 104. 
13 PATRJKARAKOS, DAVID: Nuclear Iran: The Birth of an Atomic State. New York, 2012. p. 176. 
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transparency was the cause for concern which initiated a political tug of war that has not 
been resolved yet. According to the report of the Director General of the IAEA, the or-
ganization is highly concerned about a possible Iranian nuclear weapon program, the 
existence of which is corroborated by the 2011 report of the Director General.14 Even 
though Iran is denying the claims about its military nuclear ambitions, its situation is 
still unsettled, even after countless diplomatic negotiations and sanctions. 
The problem is not only that these states do not comply with their international 
commitments, but also that they lessen the power and prestige of the NPT in the eyes of 
the international community. However, one could argue that this is not the fault of these 
states, but the fault of the NPT for not being able to stand up against these - from the 
point of view of nuclear non-proliferation - rogue states effectively. This might confirm 
the idea for some states that a possible nuclear weapons program would not result in 
unbearable consequences. Thus, the nuclear non-proliferation system lead by the NPT 
cannot deter all of the more than 180 non-nuclear weapon states from developing a mili-
tary nuclear program. 
2.2. States not parties to the treaty 
Besides States parties to the treaty that supposedly have nuclear ambitions, another 
challenge the NPT has to face is the issue of states that are not parties to the treaty. 
There are three states that have still not signed the treaty (India, Israel and Pakistan), 
and one state (North Korea) that withdrew from it. What these states have in common is 
that they have either declared having, or are considered by the international community 
to have nuclear weapons. In case all States parties fulfil their obligations under the NPT 
and nuclear disarmament is also moving forward in a promising pace, the international 
nuclear non-proliferation system will still have to deal with these states not parties to 
the treaty. 
The four states not party to the NPT have all moved on different paths to become a 
nuclear weapon state. India became a nuclear weapon state in 1974, and responding to 
its nuclear test explosions in 1998, Pakistan also conducted its first nuclear tests. North 
Korea has been mentioned in the previous category as well, since it was a signatory of 
the NPT, signing the treaty in 1985 under pressure from the international community. 
Even though the state withdrew from the NPT in 2003, its nuclear program can be 
traced back to the 1960s: this is why the international community urged North Korea to 
join the NPT, to be able to keep an eye on its nuclear ambitions. 
Israel has a unique position concerning its nuclear weapons program. We do not 
know much about this program, since the state has not yet acknowledged owning nuc-
lear weapons and an Israeli nuclear test explosion has not been detected yet either. 
However, the international community considers it an open secret, especially because 
there have been numerous leaks in the past that confirmed that Israel has a nuclear ar-
senal.15 It is noteworthy that the state planned to sign the NPT in the beginning of 1968, 
14 Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and relevant provisions of Security Council resolutions 
in the Islamic Republic of Iran. IAEA Document GOV/2013/27. p. 10. 
15 COHEN, AVNER: The Worst-Kept Secret. Israel's Bargain with the Bomb. New York, 2010, p. 241. 
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however, it had concerns about the insufficient guarantees concerning a possible nuclear 
aggression towards NPT states with a non-nuclear weapon status.16 In the end, Israel 
decided not to sign the treaty, however, it never admitted owning nuclear weapons ei-
ther. 
Even though these four states are all considered to have nuclear weapons and are not 
parties to the NPT, we have to mention that India has a special place in the NPT system. 
India is not a signatory of the treaty, however, it takes part in international nuclear trade. 
This special situation is the result of an agreement between India and the United States, 
which was signed in 2005. The aim of the agreement is to facilitate cooperation between 
the two states with regards to nuclear issues, and to open nuclear trade between them. 
For them to be able to sign this agreement, India undertook to sign the Additional Pro-
tocol of the IAEA and to let the Agency inspect its peaceful nuclear development. Fur-
thermore, the state accepted not to transfer the technology needed to develop nuclear 
weapons to states that do not have such weapons, and to continue its moratorium on 
nuclear weapon tests, thus contributing to nuclear non-proliferation.17 Not all states 
supported this special arrangement, however, the NPT does not contain a provision con-
cerning the relationship between its States parties and other states.18 Therefore, India 
can enjoy the advantages that come from nuclear trade, without the IAEA inspecting its 
whole nuclear sector. 
In light of these facts it becomes apparent that wiping nuclear weapons off the face 
of earth is not possible strictly within the framework of the NPT. Until there are states 
not party to the treaty who own nuclear weapons and are not leaning towards coopera-
tion in nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, reaching a global zero - a world free 
of nuclear weapons - is not feasible. Nevertheless the idea of complete nuclear disar-
mament keeps nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament efforts moving forward, thus 
its importance does not only lie in reaching the final goal, but also in paving the way 
towards it. 
2.3. The issue of non-state actors 
The non-proliferation framework does not only have to face the problems concern-
ing states, but also has to deal with non-state actors. In the 21st century, terrorism has 
become international, which causes serious headache to the international community. 
Terrorist groups work with a different structure, different aims and different tools. A so 
called 'new terrorism' has developed, which can be characterized as follows: new ter-
rorist groups work in a transnational manner, receive greater financing, their members 
get better training and they want to achieve new goals. Their aim is to eliminate a great 
number of - possibly civilian - victims. The structure of terrorist groups has also 
16 COHEN, 2 0 1 0 . p. 75 . 
17 Communication dated 25 July 2008 received from the Permanent Mission of India concerning a document 
entitled "Implementation of the India-United States Joint Statement of July 18, 2005: India's Separation 
Plan". IAEA Information Circular 731. p. 4. 
18 MICHEL, QUENTIN: The Control of International Nuclear Trade - Difficult Balance Between Trade 
Development and Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. In: International Nuclear Law: History, 
Evolution and Outlook. Nuclear Energy Agency (OECD), 2010. p. 302. 
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changed: they work in loose structures and do not rely on one leader or state, thus it is 
very difficult to infiltrate their organization or to even find them.19 The most dangerous 
characteristic of new terrorism is that instead of the previously used bombs, grenades 
and handheld weapons, terrorists also aim at acquiring weapons of mass destruction.20 
This can happen primarily because of the possibilies that have opened up through globa-
lization and the revolution of information technology. Among different types of wea-
pons of mass destruction, for terrorist groups, nuclear weapons are the hardest to ac-
quire, unlike biological or chemical weapons. The thought of terrorists owning a nuclear 
weapon surfaced in the 1990s. There are documented cases of fissile material gone 
missing, which most likely ended up on the black market.21 For terrorist groups, this is 
the easiest way to get hold of a nuclear weapon, since it is quite expensive to acquire 
highly enriched uranium or plutonium in the quantity required to assemble a nuclear 
weapon. If a terrorist group could assemble such a weapon, it would be complicated to 
store or transport it undetected. It is much more likely that a terrorist organization deto-
nates a so-called dirty bomb, which consists of traditional explosives mixed with ra-
dioactive material, which - after its explosion - emits nuclear radiation.22 
Even though nuclear terrorism has been regulated by more international documents 
up to now, like Resolutions 1373 and 1540 of the Security Council, the NPT's non-
proliferation framework does not mention this issue. In fact, the NPT cannot mention it: 
since non-state actors cannot be parties to the treaty, their behavior cannot be regulated 
by it either. It could be the duty of States parties to cooperate in this matter, either out-
side of the NPT system, or with the help of the forum that the NPT provides for them 
(the Review Conferences for example). At the 2010 Review Conference of the NPT, the 
debate neglected the issue of non-state actors. The participating states accepted a Final 
Document, which encourages States parties to take national and international steps to-
wards strengthening nuclear security, however, it does not mention nuclear terrorism or 
the question of non-state actors directly. The document contains an action plan which 
sets out that States parties shall fight the illicit trafficking of nuclear materials and en-
courages them to sign the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuc-
lear Terrorism.23 This is as far as the action plan goes with regards to non-state actors. 
2.4. Limits of the NPT 
A great disadvantage of the non-proliferation and disarmament framework that the 
NPT provides is that it cements an uneven system of relations between the States par-
ties. According to the NPT, five states can officially possess nuclear weapons: those 
five states, that had acquired nuclear weapons before they signed the NPT. These states 
are the French Republic, the People's Republic of China, the Russian Federation, the 
19 HOWARD, RUSSELL D. , FOREST, JAMES J. F. , BAJEMA, NATASHA: Weapons of Mass Destruction and 
Terrorism. Dubuque, 2008. p. 7. 
2 0 HOWARD, FOREST, BAJEMA, 2 0 0 8 . p . 10. 
21 HOWARD, FOREST, BAJEMA, 2 0 0 8 . p . 67 . 
2 2 HOWARD, FOREST, BAJEMA, 2 0 0 8 . p. 65 . 
23 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapon, Final 
Document [NPT/CONF.2010/50 (Vol. I)], New York, 2010. p. 27. 
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United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of Ameri-
ca, the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council. These states 
have permanent representation in the Security Council and have the power to veto any 
substantive resolution. Basically they are not only first among equals in the council, but 
also in the international community, supported by their nuclear arsenals. Initiatives have 
surfaced not only to reform the Security Council, but to reform the NPT system as well. 
The issue of the discriminatory nature of the NPT was a topic of debate at the 2010 
Review Conference of the treaty as well. At the Review Conference, States parties re-
viewed the treaty and discussed future perspectives for nuclear non-proliferation, nuc-
lear disarmament and the peaceful use of nuclear energy. The general mood of the re-
view conferences is usually affected by the injustices of the NPT system, since the trea-
ty is often viewed as discriminatory, especially by non-nuclear weapon states. Iran and 
Brazil were among the states who oppose the nature of the non-proliferation framework: 
namely the fact that it guarantees the possibility to own nuclear weapons to only a few 
states, while it does not guarantee it for others, dividing the world into two parts. Ac-
cording to the Brazilian delegate for example, the main problem is that this unjust situa-
tion is crowned by the composition of the Security Council, which strengthens the posi-
tion and prestige of nuclear powers. As a solution, the country suggested the complete 
abolition of nuclear weapons, since - according to his views - this is the only way to 
reach an equilibrium in the international community.24 
The accepted Final Document emphasized the necessity of reaching the aims stated 
in the NPT, stressing the importance of nuclear non-proliferation and confirming the 
role of international organizations such as the IAEA, the United Nations General As-
sembly and the United Nations Security Council. Moreover, the document drew atten-
tion to the Additional Protocols of the NPT, and encouraged States parties to sign them. 
The participating states were able to agree on the fact that their final goal is complete 
nuclear disarmament, which requires states not party to the NPT to sign the treaty as 
well. After the failure of the 2005 Review Conference, it was considered a notable suc-
cess that the participants of the 2010 meeting could reach a consensus and accept a final 
document despite their differences. However, the Final Document serves as nothing 
more than inspiration to States parties: it gives recommendations and draws attention to 
what should be done. However, states are not accountable for following the action plan 
or the recommendations of the Final Document, therefore the review conferences serve 
as forums for negotiation and dialogue rather than as an initial platform for action. 
The next review conference of the NPT will be held in 2015, and until then, a Prepa-
ratory Committee has been set up to pave the way for cooperation at the actual confe-
rence. 
24 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 
Summary Record of the Second Meeting [NPT/CONF.2010/SR.2], New York, 2010. p. 8. 
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3. Achievements of the treaty and additional non-proliferation initiatives 
After examining the limits and deficiencies of the NPT, its achievements must be men-
tioned as well. The NPT is considered to be the cornerstone of nuclear non-
proliferation, being the only global nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament treaty 
that incorporates almost the whole international community. 
Among its achievements, we can list the fact that numerous states left their nuclear 
weapons programs to become part of the NPT framework. The NPT, together with dip-
lomatic negotiations, led a number of states like Argentina, Brazil, South Africa, Swe-
den and Libya to abandon their nuclear developments. Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine 
represent a special case since they inherited a number of nuclear warheads and ballistic 
missiles after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. The Lisbon Protocol of 1992 settled 
this situation: according to the protocol, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Ukraine and the Russian 
Federation all became NPT signatories, and Russia inherited the nuclear power status of 
the Soviet Union. Meanwhile, the other three post-Soviet states attached declarations to 
the protocol in which they announced their nuclear-weapon-free status and that they 
would eliminate all nuclear weapons from their territory. Thus they gave up their nuc-
lear weapons to become signatories of the NPT. 
Subsequently, we must not underestimate the role of the NPT in helping the interna-
tional community reduce the number of nuclear powers. During the Cold War, theories 
emerged that there would be more than 20 states with nuclear arsenals by the end of the 
20th century. The president of the United States, John F. Kennedy stated in an interview 
in 1963 that „by 1970 (...) there may be 10 nuclear powers instead of 4, and by 1975, 
15 or 20."25 Fortunately, his prediction has not come true, and the number of nuclear 
powers remains under 10 states, 5 of which are States parties to the treaty. 
Additionally, the NPT provides balance to the international community. If a world 
free of nuclear weapons was ever reached, keeping up the global zero would be ex-
tremely difficult. It would take exceptionally strict verification systems and an initiative 
from the whole international community to make sure that no states are trying to acquire 
nuclear weapons of any kind.26 The problem with the new framework would be that 
non-state actors would still have a slight chance of creating a nuclear weapon with 
enough financial and intellectual resources and through the right networks. Further-
more, in the hypothetical world free of nuclear weapons, if one state could acquire a 
nuclear weapon, it would become superior to all other states. However, this situation is 
hypothetical and highly unlikely, since the NPT makes it much more difficult for states 
without a nuclear capability to acquire nuclear weapons or to acquire them without de-
tection. The verification measures concerning the NPT are carried out by the IAEA, and 
they include on-site inspections and continuous monitoring of the States parties. There-
fore, even if a non-nuclear weapon state would have the capability to acquire or con-
struct a nuclear weapon, it would be very difficult for it to go on with the developments 
without the IAEA or the international community noticing. 
25 The President's News Conference, 1963. http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=9124 (20 June 2013) 
26 THRANERT, OLIVER: Would we really miss the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty? International Journal, 
(63) 2008. p. 335. 
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In addition to the NPT and the IAEA, the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty 
Organization (hereinafter: CTBTO), after its entry into force will serve as a great ob-
stacle for states trying to acquire nuclear weapons, monitoring nuclear test explosions 
with its International Monitoring System (IMS) and carrying out on-site inspections in 
its member states. At the moment, the CTBTO works within the framework of its Pre-
paratory Commission, which is monitoring the world for nuclear explosions and testing 
the monitoring system before the treaty enters into force. The CTBTO Preparatory 
Commission is an initiative strengthening the international nuclear non-proliferation 
system and contributing to the aims of the NPT. Even if the treaty is not in force yet, the 
CTBTO can still help catch rogue states who have developed nuclear weapons and are 
in the testing phase, and can also detect when nuclear weapon states are further develop-
ing their nuclear arms with the help of nuclear explosions. Detection is key in these cas-
es, since it is not only the CTBTO that can act when a nuclear test happens, but the 
whole international community, after they have become aware of the explosions. There-
fore, the organization - even in its premature form - contributes to international security 
and nuclear non-proliferation. 
When highlighting the positive, security assurances must be mentioned as well. In 
1995, States parties to the NPT owning nuclear weapons issued statements of non-
binding negative security assurances, which were supported by the Security Council as 
well, as seen from resolution 984. Issuing a negative security assurance means that the 
nuclear weapon state in question undertakes not to use nuclear weapons against non-
nuclear weapon States parties to the NPT. These negative security assurances were 
made by nuclear powers who are members of the NPT: the French Republic, the 
People's Republic of China, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of Great Brit-
ain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America in the form of unilateral dec-
larations. The predecessor of these declarations was General Assembly Resolution 
21/53A in 1966, which stated that "nuclear weapons powers should give an assurance 
that they will not use, or threaten to use, nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapons 
states without nuclear weapons on their territories."27 Whether these declarations are le-
gally binding or not, remains to be seen. In 1995, at the Review Conference of the NPT, 
states adopted a recommendation stating that further steps should be taken in the direc-
tion of an internationally legally binding instrument which would protect non-nuclear 
weapon states from the threat or use of nuclear weapons.28 This recommendation can be 
seen as an indication that the unilateral declarations made by nuclear powers are not in-
ternationally legally binding yet. However, it could also be argued that the declarations 
have become part of customary international law, since it is a fact that nuclear weapons 
have not been used against non-nuclear weapon states (or any state for that matter) since 
the nuclear non-proliferation system of the NPT has been set up. Whether or not these 
declarations are legally binding, the most important factor concerning them is that they 
mean a step forward for the NPT, since they are encouraging non-proliferation. If non-
nuclear weapon states do not have to worry about a nuclear attack, their motives to ac-
27 UN General Assembly Resolution A/RES/2153(XXI)A. Perambulatory Clause 4. 
28 Decision 2: Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament [NPT/ 
CONF. 1995/32 (Part I) Annex], p. 3. 
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quire a nuclear weapon will decrease significantly. Unfortunately, the five states that 
participated in making the aforementioned declarations are not the only states that can 
carry out a nuclear attack, and the four States not parties to the NPT have not signed 
such declarations yet. 
In connection with negative security assurances, the issue of nuclear-weapon-ffee 
zones must be touched upon as well. In the case of nuclear-weapon-ffee zones, the exis-
tence of nuclear weapons is prohibited by an international treaty. Characteristics and re-
sponsibilities vary, but the United Nations General Assembly has given a general defini-
tion of a nuclear-weapon-free zone: resolution 3472 states that a nuclear-weapon-ffee 
zone is a zone where nuclear weapons are absent and an international system of verifi-
cation and control is established to ensure compliance with the founding treaties.29 As 
mentioned before, these are established by international treaties, and these treaties are 
supplemented by protocols. While the former lay down the responsibilities undertaken 
by States parties, the latter contain responsibilities for states that are not members of 
these zones. The protocols are important because a nuclear-weapon-ffee zone cannot 
fully guarantee nuclear-weapon-ffee status for its States parties if other states do not re-
spect this decision. States parties do not only want to rid themselves of nuclear wea-
pons, but also want to rule out the possibility of other states deploying or testing nuclear 
explosive devices in their territory. It must be noted that not only nuclear weapon states 
are connected to these protocols, but those states that have international responsibility 
for a territory within the region also are.30 Even though the establishment of a nuclear-
weapon-free zone is not bound by the recognition of nuclear weapon states, its effec-
tiveness is questionable without it. The main problem is that nuclear-weapon-ffee zones 
can exist de jure without guarantees from nuclear weapon states, but do not work de 
facto without them.31 These guarantees are also considered to be security assurances, 
which are - just like nuclear-weapon-ffee zones themselves - supported by the NPT and 
have been commended at the Review Conferences of the treaty. In fact the NPT deems 
these zones so useful for nuclear non-proliferation and for international peace and secu-
rity that it has been an advocate of the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-ffee zone in 
the Middle East for years. 
It is apparent that even though the NPT is the cornerstone of nuclear non-
proliferation, the non-proliferation system is supported by other treaties, organizations 
and initiatives as well. The cooperation between these and the NPT is not close in all 
cases, however, the NPT generally declares its support towards these initiatives (such as 
the CTBTO or nuclear-weapon-free zones) at its Review Conferences. 
29 United Nations General Assembly Resolution 3472 (XXX): Comprehensive study of the question of nuclear-
weapon-free zones in all its aspects. New York, 11 December 1975. B.I. 1. (a),(b) 
30 RlEMAN, ARTHUR M: Creating a Nuclear Free Zone Treaty That is True to its Name: The Nuclear Free 
Zone Concept and a Model Treaty. Denver Journal of International Law and Policy, (18) 1990. p. 249. 
31 United Nations General Assembly. Comprehensive study of the question of nuclear-weapon-free zones in 
all its aspects. Special report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament. A/10027/Add. 1. New 
York, 1975. 61. p. 
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4. Conclusion 
The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is the basis of the internation-
al nuclear non-proliferation system, a so-called cornerstone, to which all other non-
proliferation treaties and initiatives are connected. The NPT system has managed to 
keep the number of nuclear weapon states under ten, which can be considered a relative 
success in light of previous forecasts of 20 such states. The treaty plays an important 
role in maintaining this number, even if it could not stop every state with nuclear ambi-
tions from developing such weapons. 
However, the system set up by the treaty is not adequate to reach the final goal, a 
world free of nuclear weapons. Among the limits of the NPT, we can list the fact that it 
does not regulate the whole international community: four states are not parties to the 
treaty, and they all own nuclear arms. Moreover, States parties to the treaty do not al-
ways fulfil all of their obligations, causing hardships for the non-proliferation system. 
Furthermore, the NPT framework cements an uneven system of relations between States 
parties against which many of them protest: while it is legal for some states to own nuc-
lear weapons, it is prohibited for others to do so. The complete cessation of nuclear 
weapons has been recommended as a solution, however, this aim is not realistic in the 
near future. 
It can be concluded that the NPT plays an important role in regulating the nuclear 
goals of the international community, even if the system set up by the treaty is not per-
fect. The NPT and its Review Conferences provide an international forum for States 
parties to discuss nuclear-related issues, while the IAEA, the CTBTO Preparatory 
Commission and the nuclear-weapon-free zones contribute to verifying that states are 
not developing or have not developed nuclear weapons. There is a sort of security that 
the present international nuclear non-proliferation system provides for the international 
community, the main achievement of which is detecting when States parties - such as 
North Korea in the past or Iran in the present - try to delude the system. Even if the NPT 
system is not strong enough to stop rogue states from developing nuclear arms or with-
drawing from the treaty, it works as an alarm that draws attention to States parties not 
playing by the rules. 
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LÁZÁR KATA NÓRA 
A NUKLEÁRIS FEGYVEREK TERJEDÉSÉNEK 
MEGAKADÁLYOZÁSA AZ ATOMSOROMPÓ EGYEZMÉNY 
KERETEIN BELÜL: KORLÁTOK ÉS LEHETŐSÉGEK 
(Összefoglalás) 
A második világháború után általánosan elterjedt az a nézet, hogy a tömegpusztító 
fegyverek komoly veszélyt jelentenek a nemzetközi békére és biztonságra nézve. A hi-
degháború alatt ezért számos egyezményt fogadtak el az államok a nukleáris non-
proliferáció és leszerelés témakörében, amelyek között találhatunk bilaterális és multila-
terális egyezményeket, illetve globális és regionális kezdeményezéseket is. Többek kö-
zött ide sorolhatjuk a SALT-megállapodásokat, a Részleges és az Átfogó Atomcsend 
Egyezményt, illetve a nukleáris fegyvermentes övezeteket is. 
A nemzetközi nukleáris non-proliferációs rendszer igen kiterjedt és összetett, azon-
ban kiemelhetünk egy jelentős egyezményt a kérdésben, az Atomsorompó Egyezményt, 
amelyet a mai napig a nemzetközi nukleáris non-proliferációs rendszer sarokköveként 
emlegetnek. Melyek az egyezmény fő rendelkezései, és ezek hogyan formálják a non-
proliferációs rezsimet? Milyen korlátai vannak az Atomsorompó Egyezménynek, ame-
lyek megakadályozzák, hogy valóban az egész világra kiterjedjen, és elérje a végső célt, 
az atomfegyverek teljes leszerelését? A tanulmány célja választ kapni ezen kérdésekre. 
